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1 INTRODUCTION1
It is now over five years since the World Bank, in its
study on sustainable development in sub-Saharan
Africa2, first gave prominence to the term governance
in the debate on economic development. Rescued
from archaism, the term has rapidly become a
leitmotiv of aid programmes everywhere. In 1992,
the Bank published Governance and Development,
defining governance as 'the manner in which power
is exercised in the management of a country's eco-
nomic and social resources for development.' Since
then, regional development banks and the major
bilateral donors have come out with their own policy
documents defining governance and explaining how
governance has become a key criterion of country
aid eligibility, and the types of programmes and
projects the donor is prepared to assist. In 1993, the
member governments of the Development Assist-
ance Committee (DAC) of the OECD agreed on an
orientations paper on participatory development
and good governance.3 In 1994, the Bank published
the first progress report on its governance work.4
Key to understanding the Bank's approach to gov-
ernance is the distinction it draws between govern-
ance as an analytical framework and governance as
an operational concept. The Bank distinguishes
three aspects of governance: (j) the form of political
regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exer-
cised in the management of a country's economic
and social resources for development; and (iii) the
capacity of governments to design, formulate,
and implement policies and discharge functions.
Operationally, the first aspect lies outside the
Bank's mandate, which precludes the institution
from letting political considerations influence its
investment decisions.5 This is in contrast to bilateral
This paper reflects the views of its authors and should not be
read as representing the views of the World Bank.
2 Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,
World Bank, 1989.
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Governance, OECD, 1994.
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donors, most of which have placed heavy emphasis
on human rights and democracy. Thus, the Bank
has been careful in the country dialogue and in
lending to confine itself strictly to the second and
third aspects of governance. While recognizing
that governance will always have a political dimen-
sion, the Bank operationally restricts itself to the
economic dimensions of governance. In practical
terms, the mandate has been interpreted broadly:
improving public sector management, increasing
accountability, promoting transparency and infor-
mation, and assisting countries strengthen the legal
framework for development. It has also led the
Bank to develop approaches in such areas as partici-
pation in programme and project design, the control
of corruption, and the issue of military expenditure.
2 PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
The bulk of the Bank's governance work is in public
sector management: advice on public expenditures,
studies on civil service reform, financing the mod-
ernization of tax administration, assisting public
enterprise reform, or providing quick disbursing
structural adjustment lending for an economic
programme which includes reforms of the public
sector. This concern with public sector capacity is
likely to continue for several reasons. The need for
functioning government machinery to implement
and operate its projects can be expected to keep
public management reform high on the Bank's gov-
ernance agenda. Second, because of the unfinished
reform agenda, particularly in the areas of civil
service and public enterprise reform. Third, be-
cause there is increasing awareness, both within the
Bank and outside it, that a well-functioning public
sector is essential if an 'enabling environment' for
Article IV Section 10 of the Bank's Articles reads: 'The Bank and
its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member;
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political
character of the member or members concerned. Only economic
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these con-
siderations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the
purposes stated in Article I.'
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the private sector is to be created. Responsibility for
law and order, the conduct of macroeconomic policy,
the regulation of private sector markets, or the pro-
vision of social programmes to target groups are
functions that remain a public responsibility in all
countries. If the past decade, with its emphasis on
markets and the private sector, has in part been
a correction for excessive state interventionism, a
re-balancing is now in progress, signifying a recog-
nition that both the state and market are needed
for development, and that governments need to func-
tion effectively, if markets are to prosper.
The Bank's civil service reform activities have been
concentrated in Latin America and sub-Saharan
Africa, with a modest but growing involvement in
transition countries and in Asia. In total, the Bank
has supported civil service reform, in one way or
another, in over 30 countries in the past decade, In
Latin America, civil service reform is seen as part of
the overall modernization of the state. Spurred by
the political changes of the past decade, the mo-
mentum of reform has already led to substantial
shedding of excess staff, rationalization of func-
tions, and new management processes in many
countries. In Africa, civil service reform efforts have
been going on for many years, but success has been
elusive. While there are a few promising examples,
civil services throughout sub-Saharan Africa re-
main for the most part trapped in a vicious circle of
inadequate pay, excess numbers, lack of technical
skills, inadequate supporting budgets, staff demor-
alization, and public cynicism. How to break out of
this trap and create or re-establish a professional,
well-motivated and responsive civil service is a
major challenge for both donor agencies and for
governments, calling for fresh thinking on both
sides. The donor community is central to whatever
solution is found because the expansion in numbers
was partly driven, and now is sustained by aid
inflows. Country commitment is crucial because,
sustained reform depends in the final analysis on
local demand for an accountable and responsive
state. In too many countries civil service reform has
come to be seen as donor mandated downsizing.
This has led to reform programmes in which the
appearance of change is more important than the
reality (Cape Verde and Uganda are two countries
where reforms appear deeper rooted). Related to
the problems of civil service reform are the indirect
effects of high aid inflows. How these affect reform
incentives is insufficiently understood. Where aid
is poorly co-ordinated, government departments
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have little incentive to prioritize. Salary supplements
undermine staff morale, disbursement procedures
fragment financial management, and the blending
of recurrent, rehabilitation and investment compo-
nents in donor projects makes it difficult to deter-
mine what is a sustainable wage bill. Thus, it can be
argued that if civil service reform is to make head-
way in such countries, donors may have to make
explicit commitments to recurrent budgetary sup-
port outside the conventional project framework.
In return, governments may have to accept tighter
fiscal surveillance.
The Bank has also been active in public financial
management. In some regions (for example, Latin
America), a system-wide approach is being adopted.
Budgeting, cash management, financial reporting,
accounting and auditing all require reform, and
this must be done in an integrated way. In Africa,
where basic systems are fundamentally sound, the
requirement is to restore capacity, by training, by
replacing worn-out equipment, and by computeri-
zation. The need for better performance in areas
like cash management, commitment control, bank
reconciliation, cost information, and financial re-
porting is self-evident. No private sector company,
unless in a highly protected market, could survive
with the lax standards of many governments. To
better understand these problems, the Bank has be-
gun a series of financial accountability assessments,
starting with Ghana and South Africa. These review
the legal framework, standards of accounting, and
the independence of the auditing profession in both
the public and the private sectors. In Asia, the Bank
is helping to modernize accounting and auditing
practices in China, it is strengthening accounting
and auditing processes in both the public and
private sectors in Indonesia, and it is improving
financial reporting and auditing in Pakistan. Clear
from the Bank's experience in all regions is that
while at one level financial management reform is a
technical matter, success ultimately depends on the
demand of governments for accurate, relevant and
timely financial information.
Public enterprise reform has been a central part of
the Bank's governance work for many years. By
the early 1980s, it had become clear to Bank staff
that making individual enterprises more efficient
through traditional investment projects was show-
ing limited results. The approach then shifted to
the governance framework of public enterprises,
introducing performance contracts, clarifying the
powers and responsibilities of managers, removing
restrictions on pricing and pay policy, and
terminating the 'soft budget' constraint on enter-
prises - their easy access to budget subsidies and
government guaranteed loans. In the mid-1980s,
the Bank began to emphasize divestiture and
privatization, to improve efficiency through com-
petition. This remains the thrust of the Bank's policy
advice: divestiture through closure or sale of the
bulk of public enterprises, clearer objectives and
management autonomy within a performance
framework for the few deemed strategically neces-
sary to retain in public ownership. Virtually all
structural adjustment loans (SALs) have included
public enterprise reform. In many countries, SALs
have been followed by quick disbursing sector loans
and technical assistance loans focused on public
enterprise reform. Examples range across all re-
gions. Almost certainly, the most successful have
been in the Latin America and Caribbean Region,
where reforms have been driven by the desire of
governments to modernize their public sectors, a
striking recent example being Argentina. Less suc-
cessful has been public enterprise reform in Africa,
where progress has been much slower, due to a
complex set of factors such as: lack of ownership,
doubts about policy, fear of political unrest, reluc-
tance to reduce patronage opportunities, uncertain
private investor interest, and weak government ca-
pacity to implement reforms. In transition coun-
tries, the Bank's support for divestiture of state
enterprises is central to the creation of a market
economy.
Finally, the Bank has supported the world-wide
trend towards decentralization of government.
Urban sector projects have been part of the Bank's
lending for over two decades, and typically such pro-
jects have contained elements aimed at strengthen-
ing the capacity of local governments. This approach
is now changing, following a review of municipal
sector lending.6 This suggests that the traditional
approach by itself is unlikely to be effective, and
that a new approach should be developed, placing
local government in a broader framework by exam-
ining whether responsibilities are commensurate
with revenue raising capacity, whether systemic
constraints inhibit capacity development, and how
local governments are held accountable.
6 Municipal Development Sector Review, Transport, Water 'The World Bank and legal technical assistance - initial lessons',
and Urban Development Dept., World Bank, 1993. Policy Research Working Paper No 1414, Legal Department,
World Bank, January 1995.
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3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT
Economic growth through the commitment of hu-
man, technological, and capital resources depends
greatly on a set of rules securing property rights,
governing civil and commercial behaviours, and
limiting the power of the state. For a legal system
to be effective, (a) the rules must be known in
advance; (b) they must actually be in force; (c) there
should be mechanisms to ensure enforcement; (d)
conflict resolution should be carried out through
the binding decisions of an independent judicial
body; and (e) procedures should exist to amend
the rules when they no longer serve their purpose.
The Bank has been using a variety of instruments
to help countries improve their legal systems. In
addition to legal and regulatory reform compo-
nents in lending operations, grants from the Bank's
Institutional Development Fund (IDF) have been
used to support legal reforms in several countries.
Bank staff have also provided extensive advice to
governments on issues relating to legal and regula-
tory reform.
In Europe and Central Asia, the focus has been on
creating a legal framework for a market economy.
The Bank has helped develop laws on priva tization,
banking, bankruptcy, contracts, and consumer
protection. The Bank has also helped to create the
institutions necessary to enact, administer and en-
force laws by assisting countries with legislative,
administrative, and judicial reforms. In some coun-
tries, legal reform units within government struc-
tures have been created to ensure that legal reform
is carried out in an integrated, comprehensive
and consistent fashion. Similar efforts are being
supported in the transitional countries of East Asia.
In the Middle East and North Africa, emphasis has
been mostly on improving banking and finance
laws and simplifying trade and customs regula-
tions. In Latin America, a number of judicial reform
projects are either underway or being prepared. In
the public sector, the Bank has helped countries
introduce new procurement regulations. Support
in several countries has been given for the publica-
tion of government gazettes, thereby improving
transparency.
The Bank's involvement in legal reform has thus
grown in recent years. A recent review7 of legal
technical assistance listed no less than 300 Bank
loans, credits and grants financing legal technical
assistance to countries. A number of lessons are
drawn from this experience. One obvious one is the
need to match the technical assistance provided
with the legal traditions of the country. Financial
sector legislation based on common law definitions
and concepts may not readily transfer to a civil
law jurisdiction, and countries in transition from a
socialist legal system need to make a fundamental
decision on the direction of legal reform. A second
lesson is that legal reforms, especially in transition
countries, need to be sequenced. For example, a
bankruptcy law makes little sense unless corporate
forms have been defined by a company law. A third
lesson is that legislative action alone is unlikely to
be sufficient. Laws are of little use unless they are
enforced, and for this reason, the Bank has sup-
ported judicial and regulatory reform in a growing
number of countries. And legal reform, because it
involves institution building, is likely to be a long-
term process, requiring the close involvement of
local lawyers, in both the public and private sectors,
and the strong commitment of government.
It should be noted that the Bank's engagement in
legal framework reform has been only in the areas of
commercial and economic law. It has declined to
finance, in at least one country, the reform of criminal
codes, the re-equipment of police forces or the train-
ing of criminal court judges. Problems of crime and
human security in many countries may result in
further calls to support law and order functions.
4 PARTICIPATION
Following the endorsement by the Bank's Board in
September 1994 of a major report as the parti-
cipation8, participatory approaches are being
'mainstreamed' within the Bank. This means that
Bank country staff increasingly are seeking ways to
carry out studies and design projects in a more
participatory way than before. Clearly, for the Bank,
participation is both a key to sounder projects,
deeper country ownership and in turn greater
sustainability. By contributing to social capital, it
may also improve governance. More and more
projects are being prepared and implemented in
ways that involve beneficiaries and other stake-
holders, and there is growing evidence from
The World Bank and Participation, Operations Policy Depart-
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supervision reports and reviews of country portfo-
lios of better project performance.
However, as greater emphasis is given to more
participatory approaches, several issues arise. One
is the need for a framework for determining the
projects that best lend themselves to participation.
In one way, this guidance is emerging from expe-
rience. There is now strong evidence that participa-
tion is key to the success of water sector projects.
Irrigation schemes, for example, benefit greatly from
the involvement of water users in their design and
management. The same generally holds for the
urban sector, and there is scope for participation in
the design of social sector projects. But the intent
and nature of participation will vary with the
circumstances and the type of the decisions associ-
ated with a particular projects. In the case of policies
and programmes concerned with, for example, the
exchange rate, monetary policy, regulation, partici-
pation will rarely be appropriate, although consul-
tation may well play an important role in 'getting
the policy right' the first time.
A second issue is the role of governments. If govern-
ment officials are lukewarm, development agency
staff may be tempted to go directly to beneficiaries
and seek to 'empower' them by designing a role
for them in the project. However, seeking the em-
powerment of beneficiaries directly without the
consent of the government would be counter-
productive. Thus the Bank's task is to work with
governments to persuade them that the use of
participatory techniques makes for better policies,
programmes and projects. While some agencies
might be tempted to pursue participation for its
own sake, the Bank cannot without compromising
its political neutrality.
Fourth, participation is stimulating a rethinking of
the project cycle, moving away from the blueprint
approach of the classic project cycle to one that is
more flexible and experimental, while at the same
time keeping a firm vision on strategic objectives.9
5 HUMAN RIGHTS
The Bank's position on human rights has attracted
a lot of comment. It has also given rise to much
misunderstanding and in some quarters, a feeling
Roberto Picciotto and Rachel Weaving, 'A new project cycle for
ment, September 1994. the World Bank', Finance and Development, December 1994.
that the Bank is insensitive to basic human rights.
In some countries where governments have been
accused of serious human rights abuses, the Bank
has continued to lend. In others, it has cut back
lending along with bilateral donors, but for reasons
seemingly unconnected with human rights issues.
The basis for the Bank's position on human rights
is, of course, its Articles of Agreement. The Articles'
explicit wording about non-interference in the
political affairs of members makes it clear that
the Bank cannot reduce or eliminate its lending to
a country on the grounds it has violated interna-
tionally recognized political rights)0 Decisions
whether to lend for a particular project must be
taken on strictly economic grounds. The following
examples are easier to understand when the crite-
rion of economic considerations is borne in mind.
The Bank continued to lend to Chile during the
Pinochet years. It did so because the projects were
worthwhile and the regime's economic policies
were sound. In contrast, the Bank (in this case,
IDA) did not lend to Uganda during the Amin
dictatorship. The immediate reason was not the
widespread human rights abuses, but because
conditions within the country were such that no
Bank project could be expected to yield benefits.
After the confrontation between the Netherlands
and Indonesia because of human rights issues in
East Timor, the Bank agreed to take on the chair-
manship of the aid consortium because of the
Bank's long standing relationship with that country
and because it was requested to assume the role both
by the other donors and by the government. In
Kenya, when bilateral donors reduced their aid to
pressure the government to improve human rights
and hold multi-party elections, the Bank declined to
proceed with adjustment lending. This happened
because the government was unable to make the
fiscal adjustment required by the reduction in aid
commitments.
It would be wrong, however, to view the Bank's
record with respect to human rights, as some critics
do, in a negative way. The Bank believes if there
is one thing that unifies its actions, it is that they are
all aimed at helping countries to fulfil their right
to development. In the same manner, the Bank
argues that its constant emphasis on the social
sectors and its focus on poverty alleviation are
helping people to achieve basic economic and social
'° Ibrahim Shihata, 'The World Bank, human rights and the envi-
ronment', presentation at the Luiss University, Rome, November
1994.
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rights. Fulfilment of basic economic and social
rights contribute to the enjoyment of political and
civil rights. In their absence, political rights may
mean little.
Some additional points are worth making. In the
first place, the Bank is different to bilateral donors in
that it extends loans, not grants. Lending implies a
long-term relationship, characterized by disburse-
ments followed by a long period of amortization.
Stability must be an element in that relationship.
A moral hazard, familiar to bankers, arises when
lending conditions are imposed unrelated to the
borrower's repayment capacity.
Second, the Bank's mandate does not prevent staff
from assessing the political situation in a country,
and its implications for the Bank. For example, it
would be wrong to assume that the Bank takes no
account of political circumstances within a country
when deciding its future lending programme,
which it reviews on a regular basis. As a Bank, it
has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure its loans
will be repaid, and like other international lenders,
the Bank assesses political risk in setting country
exposure limits. However, it is not the 'political
character of the member,' but the economic impli-
cations of political events that determine country
lending limits. This is quite different to adjusting
its lending programme according to a country's
observance of internationally recognized political
rights.
Finally, critics of the Bank need to ponder the effect
a change in the Articles" would have on the Bank's
effectiveness. Introducing political criteria into lend-
ing decisions would clearly politicize the institution
and jeopardize its credibility. Without doubt, this
would diminish its ability to play its unique present
role assisting countries with economic reform. It
would also play into the hands of opponents of
economic reform who allege that the Bank has a
political agenda.
6 MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Following the end of the Cold War, bilateral aid
donors have become much less tolerant of coun-
tries with high levels of military expenditure. Two
DAC members, Germany and Japan, have made
The Bank's Articles may be amended by the Board of Governors
(requiring a majority of three fifths of members having at least
85 per cent of the total vote).
the reduction of military expenditure an explicit
criterion of their aid programmes. Also, there have
been calls for bilateral aid donors and multilateral
agencies to refrain from providing resources to coun-
tries with excessive levels of military expenditure.
The Bank was one of the first development agen-
cies to draw attention to the burden of military
expenditure on developing country budgets. How-
ever, it has never felt comfortable adopting either an
explicit military expenditure target or making the
reduction in military spending a formal criterion of
lending. There are several reasons for this reluc-
tance. In the first place, to do so would be in clear
contravention of the Bank's Articles. Borrowing
countries would rightly accuse the Bank of political
interference. Secondly, in contrast to other catego-
ries of government spending where the Bank has the
skills and experience to provide advise, it has no
expertise in the area of military expenditure, and no
plans to acquire it. Thirdly, countries have genuine
security needs, which need to be determined not by
reference to an arbitrary figure, but through a proc-
ess of examining options and making trade-offs be-
tween different spending priorities.
The Bank takes a pragmatic view towards military
expenditure. If there is evidence of military expen-
ditures diminishing the government's capacity to
fund civil sector programmes (such as road
maintenance, agricultural research and extension,
hospital supplies or classroom materials), it will
raise the issue in the country dialogue, typically at
a senior minister or head of government level. If
steps are not taken to reduce the share of military
spending, and the crowding out of Bank supported
programmes continues, the Bank might reduce
new lending. Here, the Bank is careful not to say
that military spending is large absolutely. Rather, it
sug-gests that it is too large in relation to other
programmes that the government is trying to imple-
ment, and a trade-off must be made if Bank support
is to continue. Where a government has already
made up its mind to reduce military expenditure,
the Bank may assist the country articulate a budget-
ary framework within which the scaling down of
military programmes can occur. Argentina and
Uganda are two countries where such help has
been given.
From a public management perspective, more im-
portant than the level of military expenditure is
the manner in which military budgets are arrived
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at. In many developing countries, there is little
public debate on the role of the defence forces and
the resources that should be allocated to them. There
are no defence white papers to stimulate public
debate, and no systematic assessment of security
risks and the options for containing them. The armed
forces vote is often no more than a single line in
the budget estimates. Financial accounts are not
published, and large parts of military spending
(such as weapons purchases) are off-budget, with
a corresponding failure to follow competitive pro-
curement procedures and to record debt obliga-
tions. Media debate is discouraged and journalists
may be harassed or even jailed. In some countries,
this lack of transparency, particularly for military
debt, has undermined Bank and IMF supported
stabilization programmes. It has also diminished
the accountability of the armed forces themselves.
Consequently, a focus on the processes by which
military budgets are arrived at rather than actual
levels is likely to be more fruitful over the longer
term. The level of external threat varies from region
to region, and the armed forces may be needed to
aid the civil power. From a governance perspec-
tive, what matters is that the armed forces should
be accountable and under civil control, and that
their budgets should be subject to scrutiny, re-
porting and auditing no less than other users of
public monies.
7 CORRUPTION
Corruption is like military expenditure. Only in
recent years has there been a willingness on the part
of development agencies to openly confront cor-
ruption as an issue of aid effectiveness. It owes its
current relevance to a pattern of change sweeping
the world. With domestic budgets cut, northern
politicians and taxpayers are critical of aid pro-
grammes which support what they perceive as
corrupt third world governments. In recent years,
there has been unprecedented media exposure of
systemic corruption in both developed and devel-
oping countries. And many commentators have
linked the poor performance of governments in
regions like sub-Saharan Africa to large scale sys-
temic corruption. It is by no means certain that
actual levels of corruption now are any higher than
at previous times. What is clear is that attitudes
have changed, and in many countries, rich and
poor, there is less willingness to tolerate corrupt
practices by politicians and public officials. The
success of Transparency International, the NGO
established less than two years ago to combat cor-
ruption in international business transactions, in
establishing national chapters in both industrial-
ized and developing countries, is striking evidence
that a sea change in public attitudes is occurring.
Corruption, along with abuse of human rights, is
the obverse of good governance. From the private
sector's perspective, corruption adds to transaction
costs and undermines confidence in markets. Ulti-
mately, it deters investment, especially from abroad.
Corruption undercuts public policy as a means of
achieving social and economic goals. Corruption
victimizes the poor who often face oppressive and
discriminatory treatment by public officials, and
lack the resources to pay for equitable treatment.
The environment suffers when bribes are paid to
circumvent zoning or pollution regulations. All coun-
tries, rich or poor, need mechanisms to combat
primary corruption (individual use of public office
for private gain). Primary corruption can be tackled
by strengthening public sector management and
punishing offenders. The issues are largely tech-
nical - diagnosing the weaknesses in existing mecha-
nisms building support for anti-corruption strat-
egy, and deciding what needs to be tackled first to
bring corruption under control. Much more difficult
is tackling secondary or systemic corruption. This
occurs when political regimes use corruption to main-
tain themselves in power, and abuse of public office
is the rule rather than the exception. Secondary
corruption and raises fundamental questions of
governance. Both types can co-exist (paradoxically
illustrated when corrupt rulers launch anti-
corruption drives).
The Bank's strategy against corruption addresses
both types. The scope for individual and systemic
corruption can be reduced by replacing admin-
istrative with market mechanisms. Trade regime
reforms simplify tariff schedules and use the ex-
change rate rather than import permits to allocate
scarce foreign exchange. Price liberalization and
the simplification of tax codes limit the scope for
rent extraction by officials. Privatization of state
enterprises should terminate what is often an
incestuous relationship between the enterprises
and their parent ministries. Where corruption is sys-
temic, however, a 'water bed' effect can often be
observed as governments concede economic reforms
under external pressure. Reforming the exchange
rate regime may shift the locus of rent seeking to
103
the customs. In addition to reducing the scope for
corruption by economic liberalization, the Bank also
helps countries buttress public management con-
trols. Thus, the Bank assists countries strengthen
their procurement systems, modernize their account-
ing and auditing systems, and reform their civil
services. The latter should include not only pay
reform, but also the restoration of ethical standards,
fair disciplinary procedures and the protection of
civil servants from political interference.
Two types of research are needed to help develop-
ing countries combat corruption. First, there needs
to be better documentation of the experience of
other countries which have successfully controlled
corruption, described in the context of prevailing
conditions, and the factors that were key to success.
New governments coming to power on a wave of
public indignation against the corruption of the
previous regime have to show results fast, if dis-
illusionment is not to follow. Second, there needs to
be a better understanding of systemic corruption,
how it works, the purposes it serves, the costs in-
curred, whether it is constrained by informal
understandings, and how it may be reduced. Not
all forms of corruption are equally dysfunctional.
This research is particularly important, given cur-
rent democratization trends. Systemic corruption
is as much an instrument of political power as it is
of personal enrichment, and competitive party
politics requires financing.
Here it must be recognized that there are limits to
what outside agencies can do - their role at best
can be a supportive one. Ultimately, all countries
have to come to terms with corruption in public life,
as they modernize and integrate with a global mar-
ket economy. This means institutionalizing formal
and informal mechanisms to control abuse of public
office and to make officials and political leaders
accountable - the heart of better governance.
8 THE BANK'S OWN GOVERNANCE
The final issue is the governance of the Bank itself.
As the Bank has raised issues of governance with its
borrowers, so has its own governance become an
issue. As the Bretton Woods institutions prepared
last year to celebrate their 50th anniversary, few
could have anticipated the orchestrated crescendo
of criticisms against the two institutions, and
particularly the Bank, principally from Northern
NGOs. This is not the place to rehearse these
criticisms but rather to mention how the Bank's
own governance is changing. Some of this, admit-
tedly, is in response to external pressure. The larger
part (and this has not been sufficiently recognized)
arises from management and staff initiatives within
the Bank.
Two significant recent changes are the formation of
the Inspection Panel, and the new Disclosure
Policy. The Inspection Panel, a direct outcome of
the environmentalists' attack on the Bank over the
Narmada Dam, is an independently constituted in-
house review body comprising three members,
appointed by the Board on the recommendation of
the President. On receipt of an appeal by an
affected party, the Panel may review whether Bank
guidelines and procedures were followed in the
preparation and implementation of projects. The
Inspection Panel reports to the Board, and its re-
ports will be public documents.12 At the time of
writing (January 1995), the Inspection Panel was
starting to consider its first case (the Arun Dam
hydroelectric project in Nepal). It is thus too early
to consider its impact on Bank operations.
To give effect to the Disclosure Policy, the Bank has
opened a Public Information Centre, where copies
of country reports and project documents approved
since January 1994, may be obtained. The Disclo-
sure Policy has been in operation since January
1994, and numerous reports and project documents
produced since then have been released. By far
the largest group requesting copies is not NGOs
but firms seeking information on Bank-financed
supplies and works contracts.
Both measures make the Bank a more open and
accountable institution. Yet, there are some residual
worries. By opening up an appeal channel for
controversial projects, the Bank inadvertently may
be externalizing accountability. From a governance
perspective, the disputed projects are country, not
Bank projects. Whether Bank staff follow institu-
tional guidelines in appraising them for financing
is of secondary importance to whether borrowing
governments are accountable for project outcomes.
A second concern is whether the prospect of publi-
12 See Ibrahim Shthata, The World Bank Inspection Panel, 1994.
13 'Effective implementation: key to developmentimpact' (Portfo-
lío Management Task Force Report), November 1992,
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cation may make some governments reluctant to
share information and confidences with the Bank.
This could be a problem with studies like public
expenditure reviews which probe the inner work-
ings of government. While there are safeguards (the
government has an opportunity to request changes
or deletions), there is obviously a tension between
the sharing of information between donor agencies
and the benefits of wider debate in the country on
public policy on the one hand, and the Bank's role as
adviser to governments on the other.
Simultaneously with these formal changes in the
Bank's governance, a 'quiet revolution' in the
Bank's management processes is underway. This
began with the report of an internal task force on
portfolio management (the Wapenhans Report13) in
1992, which found that while 80 per cent of the
current portfolio of projects was performing well,
20 per cent was incurring major difficulties. The
task force made recommendations to improve the
quality of Bank financed projects. The action
programme subsequently adopted14 is now in its
second year of implementation. Among the many
recommendations aimed at improving the quality
of Bank financed projects and results on the ground
are: an increased emphasis on supervision and the
introduction of formal country portfolio perform-
ance reviews (CPPRs) as part of the Bank's core
business process, improved procedures for formu-
lating country assistance strategies (CAS), and the
mainstreaming of participatory techniques in pro-
ject design and implementation. The Bank's stand-
ards for financial accountability have also been
reviewed.15 Staff training is being improved, and a
growing number of country departments within
the Bank are re-engineering their country pro-
gramme and project review processes with the aim
of reducing costs and improving responsiveness
to clients. The Bank's internal operational guide-
lines are being comprehensively overhauled and
reissued to staff. And in September 1994, a series
of comprehensive administrative budget cuts,
stretching over two years (a 13 per cent reduction in
cash terms) was announced in order to force manag-
ers to streamline procedures, improve efficiency,
and cut out unnecessary work.
4 Portfolio Management: Next Steps, World Bank, 1993.
15 Report of the Financial Reporting and Auditing Task Force,
World Bank, 1994.
It is too early to reach judgement on the success
of the reforms (although there is encouraging pre-
liminary information on portfolio improvement).
Nevertheless, it is clear that a much more far reach-
ing programme of internal staff and management
improvements than ever before attempted is
underway in the Bank, with significant implications
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for the institution's governance. To the outsider,
these changes read like a list of management con-
sultant's recommendations. Behind the jargon,
funda-mental change in the methods, practices and
culture of the institution is occurring, as the Bank
reorients itself.
